SHOULD CORPORATION LAW INFORM ASPIRATIONS
FOR GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
PRACTICES-OR VICE VERSA?'
E. NORMAN VEASEYe
Yesterday I had the honor to give the keynote address in
Stockholm, Sweden, to the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development ("OECD"). Some of what was discussed there is

relevant here.
At the OECD Conference, all European countries and many other
countries around the world were represented in a kind of United
Nations setting. The conferees were exchanging ideas on issues of
company law reform. One theme emerged as dominant: Many
conferees were yearning for a judicial system like the well-developed
system ofjudge-made fiduciary duty law we have in Delaware. They all
seemed to believe our system works well, even with all its warts. They
were amazed by, and envious of, our expertise, fact-specificity, and the
speed of our decisions. But they seemed to be resigned to the reality
that theirjudicial systems were not set up to replicate Delaware's.
I.

THE ENABLING MODEL

An overarching global debate is whether corporate law rules
should be mandatory or enabling. I agree with those scholars whose
thesis is that the enabling model is the better economic model for the
stockholders. The enabling model, patterned after the Delaware
approach, is based on a few fundamental statutory guideposts and
latitude for private ordering, with primary reliance on self-governance
centered around judicial decisionmaking in applying fiduciary duties
to fact-intensive settings.
A word of caution is that thejudge-made law must not be of a freewheeling or ad hoc quality. It must involve a disciplined and stable
stare decisis analysis based on precedent and a coherent economic
rationale. The private ordering aspect of it must provide ex ante the
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contractual stockholder protections deemed important, as distinct
from ex postjudicial rewriting of the contractual framework.
At the end of the day the enabling model-at least in Delawarerests on a two-fold trust in the judiciary and in the board of directors.
That trust, in turn, is predicated on two fundamental principles: The
first is character-by that I mean expertise, diligence, good faith,
independence, and professionalism. The second is a sound economic
rationale dedicated to the best interests of stockholders.
First, the courts. Investors, as the owners of corporations, have
certain expectations of the role of courts in the enforcement of
fiduciary duties. The judicial process is a key ingredient in the overall
corporate construct among the four parties involved-the
stockholders, directors, management, and state government
(legislative, executive, and judicial). Courts should be prompt, clear,
predictable, stable, and economically coherent.
Second, the directors.
All the attributes of character are
important. But perhaps the most effective stockholder protection
Stockholders vote for
device is the independence of directors.
directors and expect proper governance from them. The expectation
is a strong bond of trust vested in the directors. Courts enforce that
trust. At the same time, courts should be reluctant to interfere with
business decisions and should not create surprises or wild doctrinal
swings in their expectations of directorial behavior.
The duties of directors are defined in broad outline by the
enabling act. The fiduciary aspects of the directors' duties are fleshed
out by the case law. That is the corporate law dimension. The
remainder of the corporate governance regime consists of private
ordering, norms, and aspirations of well-motivated directors to
achieve best practices with the precatory encouragement of courts.
Modern and enlightened corporation law driven primarily by
judicial decisions is a remarkable vehicle in our jurisprudence. There
is a significant self-governing aspect to the corporation law in that
daily functions of the enterprise are based largely on norms-i.e.,
Self-governance
nonlegally enforceable governance mechanisms.
works for the most part because of the sensitivity of directors to do
what is right, what is professional, what is honorable, and what is
profitable. There are also negative motivators such as peer pressure,
"shaming," and fear of lawsuits.
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II. THE ROLES OF THE BOARD

Let us focus on the various roles of the board. Under statutory
law, the business and affairs of the corporation are to be managed by
or under the direction of the board of directors. The board hires
management-personified by the CEO-and management makes
most of the "enterprise decisions"-(e.g., should the plant be in
Peoria or Pittsburgh?). Enterprise decisions are to be distinguished
The interests of stockholders are
from "ownership decisions."
affected directly by ownership decisions, which can happen in
corporate mid-life, but usually come as part of final period decisions
(such as mergers).
The question then becomes: How should corporate law-nestled
in the enabling mode-approach the judicial oversight of the board?
Complete lack ofjudicial review of all corporate conduct is clearly not
an option. A generalized, regulatory review of internal affairs or
corporations is not an option either, in my view. Judicial review is
triggered by a case that is usually brought by a stockholder in some
individual or representative capacity. The scope of judicial review
varies with the subject matter. Generally speaking, enterprise
decisions receive deferential judicial review, as do some ownership
decisions. Interested director transactions, hostile takeovers, change
of control transactions, and some ownership decisions may receive
more intense judicial scrutiny.
Courts do not reach out to monitor boards or to resolve disputes.
Courts, therefore, are like the clams sitting in the water waiting for
some activity to come their way. That said, I think judges can and
should perform a service by speaking out to encourage best corporate
practices that could have a prophylactic benefit in minimizing the
exposure of directors to liability.
When a controversy comes their way, the courts must approach
the resolution realistically, fairly, efficiently, and based on a coherent
economic and jurisprudential rationale. In this connection, I would
like to mention just four issues: (1) independence of directors; (2)
best interests of stockholders; (3) duty of care; and (4) best corporate
practices.
A. Independence ofDirectors

Under Delaware fiduciary duty law, the independence of directors
becomes critical in some discrete areas. For example, two areas are
interested director or controlling stockholder transactions and
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derivative litigation. There are others, of course. But there is no
"bright line" or "litmus test" for independence. It must be decided on
a case-by-case basis. Generally speaking, the more the board is
dominated by purely independent directors, the more likely it is that
board action will find a safe harbor from liability in many settings.
Thus, the relevant inquiries are: Independent for what purpose?
Independence from whom?
Recently the derivative case of Brehm v. Eisner was before the
Delaware Court of Chancery and the Supreme Court.' The case
involved the board of Walt Disney Company. The Chancellor decided
that a majority of the board was independent for purposes of the
demand requirement. The issue there was fact-specific, issue-specific,
The Chancellor approached the issue
and director-specific.
pragmatically and analytically. 2 We did not disturb this holding on
appeal, although we remanded the case for other reasons.
In the Supreme Court, on appeal, the Council of Institutional
Investors asked us to adopt a defined and generalized standard of
independence. We thought the proposal was interesting, but we
found it unnecessary to address the question.3
Their proposal, among other things, would have us create by the
common law a standard whereby there would be a presumption that a
director was not independent if she fell into certain categories.
Specifically, the Council defines an "independent director" as
someone whose "only non-trivial professional, familial or financial
connection to the corporation or its CEO is his or her directorship."
To clarify what types of relationships are "non-trivial," the Council
has gone on to specify the following circumstances as ones that create
a presumption of nonindependence:
* where the director has been employed by the corporation or
an affiliate in an executive capacity;
* where the director is, or in the past two years has been, an
employee or owner of a firm that is a paid adviser or
consultant to the corporation, its affiliate, or the CEO;
* where the director is employed by, or has a five percent or
greater ownership interest in, a significant customer or
supplier;

Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litig., 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998).
In reWalt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 354-61.
Brehm, 746 A.2d at 256-58.
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where the director is employed by, or has a five percent or
greater ownership interest in, a debtor or creditor of the
corporation if the amount owed exceeds one percent of the
corporation's or the third party's assets;
* where the director has, or in the past two years has had, a
personal services contract with the CEO, the corporation, or
one of its affiliates;
* where the director is employed by, or serves as an officer or
director of, a nonprofit corporation, foundation, university, or
other organization that receives significant grants or
endowments from the corporation or one of its affiliates;
• where the director is a relative of an executive of the
corporation or one of its affiliates; and
• where the director is part of an interlocking directorate in
which the CEO or other executive officer of the corporation
serves on the board of another corporation that employs the
director.
In my view, the foregoing criteria, if adopted voluntarily by a
corporation, would provide a reliable and consistent basis for
determining whether a director should be deemed independent.
Such a result may well be a desired goal of most institutional investors.
But it is not the province of the courts to "legislate" or otherwise
impose such rules. Moreover, I doubt that the Delaware Legislature
would find such rules appropriate for a statutory provision as part of
the enabling act which is the Delaware General Corporation Law.
The inquiry in the Disney case was not whether we "liked" the
composition, behavior, and decisions of Disney's board as alleged in
the Complaint. That determination is not for the courts. It is a
decision for the stockholders to make in voting for directors, in
urging other stockholders to reform or oust the board, or in making
individual buy-sell decisions involving Disney securities. Codes of best
practices or corporate bylaws (like those of General Motors, for
example)-not judicial fiat-are the appropriate intracorporate
vehicle to establish this type of protocol.
There may be a paradox on the issue of the desirability of
independent directors. On the one hand, independent directors
know less than insiders about a firm, have less stake in the decision
and, therefore, less incentive to get things right. What is the right
balance of these considerations? Are investors necessarily better off
economically with majority-independent boards? For some firms,
boards dominated by insiders may be better because people with more
*
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time (and their money on the line) may well do betterjobs. But I do
not think that should be the norm for public companies, although in
some cases a blended board balanced between independent directors
and knowledgeable insiders may be optimal. This just proves that, in
this area as with other governance models, there is no "one size fits
all."
Although independence of directors may not necessarily
guarantee the best economic return to stockholders, I think the better
view, generally, is that a worthwhile goal is to have a significant
majority of independent directors on the board. Independence offers
to investors some assurance that the governance process has integrity.
B. Best Interests of Stockholders
Ourjurisprudence is full of the rubric that directors should act in
the honest belief that the action taken is in the best interests of the
corporation and its stockholders. A question kept coming up at the
OECD Conference in Stockholm on the convergence of the interests
of stockholders and other stakeholders and the potential that
stockholders and other stakeholders often have varying interests.
The OECD Principles differ from Delaware law in the articulation
of the board's obligation to stakeholders (employees, creditors,
community, etc.). Delaware's jurisprudence holds that the interests of
stockholders are primary and may not be trumped by that of other
constituencies, although those interests may be considered if
congruent with the interests of the stockholders. The concern I
expressed at the OECD Conference is that too much emphasis placed
on stakeholders or other constituencies diffuses the primary focus of
directors-the best economic interests of stockholders.
Let us step back for a minute and look at the economic reality of
Corporations do indeed function according to
corporate life.
norms-most of the time. Litigation is a costly last resort and should
be reserved for bad, aberrational behavior. Why? That is part of the
theory of derivative litigation. It is well explained in the cogent dicta
ofJudge Ralph Winter of the Second Circuit in the 1982 case ofJoy v.
North and those of former Delaware Chancellor Allen in the 1996 case
of Gagliariv. TriFoods International,Inc.5 I will try to paraphrase some
of these dicta and amalgamate them with my own views of the

4

692 F.2d 880,884-86 (2d Cir. 1982).
683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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economic rationale of the corporate construct.
Stockholders expect their investment to be profitable, but they
undertake the risk of bad business judgment by the directors or the
management. Investors have many investment opportunities other
than stock and these opportunities (like bonds) may be less
vulnerable than stockholdings to mistakes in judgment by corporate
management. Equity investors need not invest in a particular
corporation. Stockholders can and do select among investments
partly on the basis of management. As a result, the business judgment
rule recognizes the stockholders' tacit acceptance of the risk of bad
business decisions.
Stockholders' investment interests, across the full range of their
diversifiable equity investments, will be maximized if corporate
directors and managers honestly assess risk and reward and accept for
the corporation the highest available risk-adjusted returns that are
above the finn's cost of capital.
After-the-fact litigation is a wasteful device to deal with
questionable business decisions. The circumstances surrounding the
directors' decisions are not easily reconstructed in a courtroom years
later. The board must encounter risks and confront uncertainty in a
tight time period. A decision that seems reasoned at the time made
may seem dead wrong when viewed years later against a background
of hindsight knowledge.
Some of these points are well made by Professor Hamermesh in
his recent article entitled, I1hy IDo Not Teach Van Gorkon.b His thesis is
that a proper analysis of the rationale for the tendency to accord
deference to directors in the due care area is the recognition by
sophisticated courts of the value to investors of managerial risk-taking.
This is a good segue that brings me now to the subject of the duty of
care.
C. Duty of Care
The duty of care raises many questions about decisionmaking
process, oversight and duty to monitor, personal liability, exemptions
and defenses, injunctions and transactional justification, gross
negligence and recklessness, and the borders between lack of due care
and lack of good faith.

" Laiwrence A. Hamermesh, Why I Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REv. 477,
482 (2000).
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But the overarching philosophical issue has to do with the best
economic interests of stockholders. Directors will tend to be riskaverse if they must assume some degree of personal risk relating to ex
post claims of derivative liability for any resulting corporate loss
occasioned by a business decision gone bad. Directors need not worry
under our law for mistakes ofjudgment-even "stupid" ones.
As to business decisions, the business judgment rule has the effect
of freeing directors and the CEO to take business risks. This is the
way we paraphrased the business judgment rule in the Disney case:
Directors' decisions will be respected by courts unless the directors are
interested or lack independence relative to the decision, do not act in
good faith, act in a manner that cannot be attributed to a rational
business purpose, or reach their decision by a grossly negligent
process.
Courts do not measure, weigh, or quantify directors' judgments.
We do not even decide if board decisions are "reasonable" in this
context. Due care in the decisionmaking context is process due care
only. Irrationality-not unreasonableness-is the outer limit of the
business judgment rule. Irrationality may implicate a lack of good
faith or be the functional equivalent of waste.
The relative freedom given directors under the business judgment
rule has a counterpoint that is also of benefit to stockholders. It is
decidedly in the stockholders' economic interest that courts firmly
enforce violations of the duty of loyalty. In such cases there may be
severe damage awards against directors or officers who act in their
own self-interest and not in the interest of the firm. A recent example
is a per curiam decision by the Delaware Supreme Court released last
week in International Telecharge, Inc. v. Bomarko, Inc.' In Bornarko, we

affirmed a decision after trial by Vice Chancellor Lamb finding a
faithless fiduciary liable for substantial damages for violating his duty
of loyalty.
There is, therefore, an exposure of directors for fraud, disloyalty,
law violation, bad faith, and the like. There is also a theoretical
exposure to personal liability in damages for gross negligence in
process due care that forfeits the protection of the business judgment
rule and requires the fiduciary to show entire fairness. The same may
be true for sustained inattention or utter failure to have law
compliance systems, for example.
The potential for liability may be only theoretical because of
7

766 A-2d 437 (Del. 2000) (per curiam).
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certain statutory protections. There are at least two Delaware statutes
that offer the directors some protection in the due care area.
First, under one Delaware statute, directors may be
fully protected in relying in good faith upon the records of the
corporation and upon such information, opinions, reports or statements
presented to the corporation by any of the corporation's officers or
employees, or committees of the board of directors, or by any other
person as to matters the member reasonably believes are ithin such
other person's professional or expert competence and who has been
selected ith reasonable care by or on behalf of the corporation.8
Second, there is another statutory exemption that, when adopted
in the corporate charter by stockholders, exempts directors from
liability for negligence. In 1986, Delaware took the lead in adopting
section 102(b) (7) of the general corporation law after the Delaware
Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom.9 Most state
legislatures have since authorized, and stockholders of most
corporations have taken advantage of, this type of an exoneration of
directors of liability for duty of care violations. It is interesting that
stockholders have willingly and overwhelmingly adopted these
statutory protections for their directors. On the other hand, many
stockholders would prefer to eliminate or substantially curtail
"defensive measures" such as poison pills often installed by the board
and used by directors at the corporate end period, primarily in a
hostile takeover context. Moreover, charter amendments that would
provide some takeover protections, such as a staggered board of
directors, are a "hard sell."
What is the reason for this "phenomenon" that stockholders favor
eliminating liability of directors for lack of due care but are opposed
to defensive measures? It is not really a surprising phenomenon. It is
quite understandable and predictable. Stockholders generally do not
want directors to worry about negligence lawsuits because these suits
are costly to the finn and distract the directors and officers from their
mission-formation of capital and turning a profit to benefit
stockholders.
The investors have said to the directors, in effect: "Don't worry
about personal liability in damages for negligence or even gross
negligence; we will not only exempt you from such threats, but we will
also provide you with indemnification and insurance protection, just

DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (1991).
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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in case. You are expected to devote your energies to doing good
economic work for the firm, and that is to our benefit."
But the stockholders likewise have said, in effect: "We do not
excuse you from liability in damages for breach of your duty of loyalty,
bad faith, intentional misconduct, improper personal benefit, etc.
Nor do we like it when you erect draconian barriers that may inhibit
an outside offer for our stock at a premium."
Thus personal liability in damages for due care violations is not a
practical worry for directors in their daily midstream enterprise
decisions. But it can be important, particularly in end period or
ownership decisions for four reasons.
First, equitable relief. The statutory exemption from personal
liability in damages for negligence does not preclude injunctive or
other equitable relief for due care violations in the transactional
justification calculus.
Second, the requirement of good faith. A director must always act
in good faith, and section 102(b) (7) does not exonerate directors
from liability for acts or omissions not in good faith or for violations of
the duty of loyalty. So this raises the question: When is an act or
omission so egregiously lacking in due care or so reckless that it
evidences a lack of good faith? No director wants to be a defendant in
a case testing those doctrinal borders.
Third, economic interests. Even if there are no personal liability
concerns, a high-profile lack of due care by directors could
undermine stockholder confidence. This could depress the stock
price, cause the directors to be ousted at the next election of
directors, or may lead to the rare exercise of the stockholders'
statutory right of removal of the directors.
Fourth, personal integrity. Directors are, on the whole, honorable
people who want to do the correct, professional thing and don't want
their reputations injured. My sense is that, notwithstanding the
statutory exoneration from liability for due care violations, it is the
professional integrity of directors that drives them to do a good and
careful job.
D. Best CorporatePractices
All good corporate governance practices include compliance with
statutory law and case law establishing fiduciary duties. But, as we said
in the Disney case, the law of corporate fiduciary duties and remedies
for violation of those duties are distinct from the aspirational goals of
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ideal corporate governance practices.
Aspirational ideals of good corporate governance practices for
boards of directors that go beyond the minimal legal requirements of
the corporation law are highly desirable, often tend to benefit
stockholders, might be a "safe harbor" in some cases, sometimes
reduce litigation, and can usually help directors avoid liability. But
they are not required by the corporation law and do not necessarily
define standards of liability.
There are many models of codes of good corporate practice that
have voluntarily been adopted by corporations. Those of General
Motors and Campbell Soup are two examples. This is one area where
the OECD countries and the United States corporate governance
protocols are "on the same page." By voluntarily adopting best
practices, OECD countries can sometimes finesse the problem that
their systems usually lack meaningfil resort to the courts. United
States companies are well advised to adopt best corporate practices to
stay out of court. The courts like that, too, because we already have
crowded dockets and would prefer not to have so many cases.
We see today an emphasis on due care processes as well as the
preponderance of independent directors as part of good corporate
governance practices. Indeed these practices are becoming the norm,
though they may not be required.
So corporate law does, I believe, inform good corporate practices.
Furthermore, I believe it advances a social good for courts to
encourage such aspirations.
The same may be true in reverse. That is, modem trends in good
corporate governance may become such well-established norms that
the failure to follow the trends could conceivably result in liability in
an egregious case. So good corporate practice may inform corporate
law. A colleague and I hinted at that in a law review article over
twenty years ago when I was in private practice.' In 1996, former
Chancellor Allen, in dictum in the Caremark case suggested that
because the federal sentencing guidelines contained an incentive for a
good oversight program, there was almost an expectation that boards
should have one and the utter failure to do so might be problematic."
Therefore, exposure to personal liability in damages for violation

E. Norman Veasey & William E. Manning, Codfied Standard-Safe Harbor
or
Uncharted Reef? An Analysis of the ModelAct Standard of Care Compared with Delaware Law,
"o

35 Bus. Lkw. 919 (1980).
SIn reCaremark Int'l Inc. Derihative Lifig., 698 A.2d 959, 969-70 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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of the duty of care might seem far-fetched except in a very unusual
factual setting. On the other hand, liability for duty of loyalty
violations can be quite real and quite severe. Nevertheless, why
should we (and I include the judges in the term "we") not exhort
boards to have the best, professional corporate practices?
CONCLUSION

As long as we have judge-made law as the core of Delaware's
corporate law system, we must focus on ways to improve the reliance
of investors and courts on boards of directors operating with integrity
at the heart of that system. Thus, we need to seek aspirational norms
for good corporate practice. I have seven suggestions of my own for
boards of directors. These are recommended protocols offered as an
aspirational matter only. They do not necessarily drive liability
considerations, and they do not portend how a case will be decided.
Nevertheless, they may reflect some developing norms of corporate
behavior. The seven suggestions are:
First, there should be a heavy majority of purely independent
directors on every board. There are several definitions in various
models of guidelines that corporations should consider adopting
voluntarily.
Second, the board should be engaged in actual governance, and
not merely act as advisors' io the CEO. This does not mean that the
board runs the operations of the company (normally it should not).
It means directors are in control of the policy of the firm, and the
managers work for them.
Third, the directors should meet face-to-face frequently
throughout the year and spend substantial time on their homework.
A minimum of at least one hundred hours per year on routine matters
on each board has been suggested and seems reasonable, in my view.
Of course more may be required in time of crisis, and directors should
not become so overcommitted that they cannot deal adequately with
crises.
Fourth, the directors should limit to a reasonable number the
major boards on which they serve. What is a reasonable number
depends on the extent to which each director is able to carry out his
or her responsibilities to each board in a professional manner, leaving
room for crisis management when necessary.
Fifth, naturally, the board should have audit, compensation, and
nominating committees consisting solely of independent directors,

20011

ASPIRATIONS FOR GOOD CORPORATE GOIERNANCE

2191

independently advised. Moreover, the independent directors should
regularly evaluate the CEO and they should meet with each other
alone in executive session on a regular basis.
Sixth, the board should establish and monitor reasonable law
compliance programs.
Seventh, the board should carefully review disclosure documents
for which they have direct responsibility to ensure that all material
information reasonably available is disclosed to the relevant audience.
I hope it is clear that these suggestions are purely aspirational and
not necessarily liability-related. At best, they may be in the nature of
safe harbors in certain circumstances. In my view, they are becoming
the norms and the reasonable expectations of stockholders.
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